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We revisit the following question: what is the optimal round complexity of veriﬁable secret
sharing (VSS)? We focus here on the case of perfect VSS where the number of corrupted
parties t satisﬁes t < n/3, with n the total number of parties. Work of Gennaro et al.
(STOC 2001) and Fitzi et al. (TCC 2006) shows that, assuming a broadcast channel, three
rounds are necessary and sufﬁcient for efﬁcient VSS. Existing protocols, however, treat the
broadcast channel as being available “for free” and do not attempt to minimize its usage.
This approach leads to relatively poor round complexity when such protocols are compiled
to run over a point-to-point network. We show here a VSS protocol that is simultaneously
optimal in terms of both the number of rounds and the number of invocations of broadcast.
Our protocol also satisﬁes a certain “2-level sharing” property that makes it useful for
constructing protocols for general secure computation.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The round complexity of cryptographic protocols has been the subject of intense study. Besides protocols for general
secure computation, protocols for various speciﬁc functionalities of interest (e.g., broadcast, zero-knowledge proofs, etc.)
have also been explored. Here, we revisit the case of veriﬁable secret sharing, whose deﬁnition we now recall informally.
(Formal deﬁnitions appear in Section 2.) In secret sharing [2,19], there is a dealer who shares a secret among a group of
n parties in a sharing phase. The requirements are that, for some parameter t < n, any set of t colluding parties gets no
information about the dealer’s secret at the end of the sharing phase, yet any set of t + 1 parties can recover the dealer’s
secret in a later reconstruction phase. Secret sharing assumes the dealer is honest; veriﬁable secret sharing (VSS) [3] also
requires that, nomatter what a cheating dealer does (in conjunctionwith t − 1 other colluding parties), there is some unique
secret to which the dealer is “committed” by the end of the sharing phase. VSS serves as a fundamental building block in
the design of protocols for general secure multi-party computation as well as other specialized goals (such as Byzantine
agreement); thus, it is of interest to understand the inherent round complexity for carrying out this task.
In this work we will always consider perfect VSS, where the security guarantees are unconditional (i.e., they hold even
against an unbounded adversary), privacy is perfect, and the protocol is error-free. Perfect VSS is known to be possible if and
only if t < n/3 [1,6]. Previous research investigating the round complexity of VSS, surveyed further below, has focused on
optimizing the round complexity assuming a broadcast channel is available “for free”. (We remark that broadcast is essential
for VSS, in a way we make precise below.) As argued previously [12], however, if the ultimate goal is to optimize the round
complexity of protocols for point-to-point networks (where protocols are likely to be run), then it is preferable to minimize
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the number of rounds in which broadcast is used rather than to minimize the total number of rounds. This is due to the high
overhead of emulating a broadcast channel over a point-to-point network: deterministic broadcast protocols require (t)
rounds [8]; known randomized protocols [7,9,13] require only O(1) rounds in expectation, but the constant is rather high.
(The most round-efﬁcient protocol known [13,14] requires 18 rounds in expectation for t < n/3.3) Moreover, when using
randomized broadcast protocols, if more than one invocation of broadcast is used then special caremust be taken to dealwith
sequential composition of protocols without simultaneous termination (see [15,13,12]), leading to a substantial increase in
the round complexity. As a consequence, a constant-round protocol that only uses a single round of broadcast is likely to
yield a more round-efﬁcient protocol in a point-to-point setting than any protocol that uses two rounds of broadcast (even
if that protocol uses no additional rounds).
As a concrete example (taken from [12]) to illustrate the point, consider the VSS protocol of Micali and Rabin [16] and the
“round-optimal” VSS protocol of Fitzi et al. [10]. The former uses 16 rounds but only a single round of broadcast; the latter
uses three rounds, two of which require broadcast. Compiling these protocols for a point-to-point network using the most
round-efﬁcient techniques known (see [12]), theMicali–Rabin protocol requires 26 rounds in expectationwhile the protocol
of Fitzi et al. requires at least 60 rounds in expectation!
In light of the above, when discussing the round complexity of protocols that assume a broadcast channel we keep track
of both the number of rounds aswell as the number of rounds inwhich broadcast is used. (In a given roundwhen broadcast is
used, each party may use the broadcast channel but a rushing adversary is still assumed. Existing broadcast protocols can be
modiﬁed so that the round complexity is unchanged even if many parties broadcast in parallel.) We say a protocol has round
complexity (r, r′) if it uses r rounds in total, and r′ ≤ r of these rounds invoke broadcast. In this work, the round complexity
of VSS refers to the sharing phase only since most known protocols, as well as the protocols described here, utilize only a
single round of point-to-point communication in the reconstruction phase. (Exceptions include [10,17].)
1.1. Our results and techniques
Gennaro et al. [11] show that three rounds are necessary for perfect VSS, even assuming a broadcast channel. We also
observe that it is impossible to construct a strict constant-round protocol for VSS without using a broadcast channel at all:
VSS implies broadcast using one additional round (the message to be broadcast can be treated as the input for VSS), and
results of Fischer and Lynch [8] rule out strict constant-round protocols for broadcast. Prior work [16,10,12,14] shows that
optimal round complexity as well as optimal use of the broadcast channel could each be obtained individually for VSS, but it
was unknown whether they could be obtained simultaneously. Here, we resolve this question and show a (3, 1)-round VSS
protocol that is optimal in bothmeasures. As a consequence, we obtain a VSS protocolwith the best known round complexity
in point-to-point networks. Our work also leads to an improvement in the round complexity of the most round-efﬁcient
broadcast protocols known [13].
A nice feature of our VSS protocol is that it also satisﬁes a certain “2-level sharing” property that is not achieved by the
3-round protocol from [10]. Roughly speaking, this means that the following conditions hold at the end of the sharing phase
when the dealer’s (effective) input is s:
1. There exists a polynomial f (x) of degree at most t such that f (0) = s and each honest party Pi holds the value f (i). Said
differently, at the end of the sharing phase each honest party Pi holds a value si with the property that these {si} all lie
on a degree-t polynomial f (whose constant term is s).
2. For each party Pi, there exists a polynomial fi(x) of degree at most t such that fi(0) = f (i) and each honest party Pj holds
the value fi(j).
VSS protocols with these properties (the ﬁrst one in particular) constitute a useful building block for protocols for general
secure multi-party computation (see, e.g., [12,14]).
Our protocol is efﬁcient, in that the computation and communication are polynomial in n. The communication complexity
of our protocol isO(n2t) ﬁeld elements, whichmatches the communication complexity of [10] but is worse than that of [11].
We now summarize the basic techniques used to prove our main result. As in [10], we begin by constructing a protocol
forweak veriﬁable secret sharing (WSS) [18]. (InWSS, informally, if the dealer is dishonest then, in the reconstruction phase,
each honest party recovers either the dealer’s input or a special failure symbol.) Fitzi et al. show a (3, 2)-roundWSS protocol
that essentially consists of the ﬁrst three rounds of the 4-round VSS protocol from [11]. On a high level, their protocol works
as follows: In the ﬁrst round, the dealer distributes the shares of the secret using a random bivariate polynomial; in parallel,
each pair of parties (Pi, Pj) exchanges a random pad ri,j . In the second round, Pi and Pj check for an inconsistency between
their shares by broadcasting their common sharesmaskedwith the randompad. In the third round, if there is a disagreement
between Pi and Pj in round 2 (note that all parties agree whether there is disagreement since broadcast is used in round 2),
then the dealer, Pi, and Pj all broadcast the share in question. This allows the rest of the parties to determine whether the
dealer “agrees” with Pi or with Pj .
3 The claimed round complexity relies on results from this work.
J. Katz et al. / Information and Computation 207 (2009) 889–899 891
A (5, 1)-roundWSS protocol is implicitly given in [12].4 There, rather than using the “random pad” technique, a different
method is used to detect disagreement between Pi and Pj . While this saves one round of broadcast, it requires additional
rounds of interaction.
To construct a (3, 1)-round WSS protocol, we modify the (3, 2)-round WSS protocol from [10] by using the random pad
idea with the following twist: in the second round of the protocol, Pi and Pj check if there is any inconsistency between their
shares by exchanging their common shares over a point-to-point link; they also send the random pad ri,j to the dealer. In
the third round of the protocol, if there is a disagreement between Pi and Pj , then Pi and Pj each broadcast the shares they
hold; otherwise, they broadcast the value of their common share masked with the random pad. The dealer will broadcast
the corresponding share masked with the random pad (or the share itself if the random pads it received from Pi and Pj are
different). Notice that secrecy of the share is preserved if Pi, Pj , and the dealer are all honest. On the other hand, if the dealer
is malicious and there is a disagreement between honest parties Pi and Pj , then the dealer can only “agree” with at most one
of Pi and Pj in round 3, but not both of them.
The above is the high-level idea of our WSS protocol. Using the same techniques as in [10], we can then immediately
obtain a (3, 1)-round VSS protocol. However, the VSS protocol constructed in this manner will not have the “2-level sharing”
property; as a consequence, the resulting protocol cannot directly be plugged in to existing protocols for general secure
multi-party computation.
To convert the VSS protocol into one with 2-level sharing we note that, by the end of the sharing phase, there is a set
of honest parties (that we call a “core set”) who already do have the required 2-level shares; thus, we only need to provide
honest parties outside the core set with their required shares. We achieve this, as in [5], by having the dealer use a symmetric
bivariate polynomial to share its input, and then modifying the protocol so that honest parties who are not in the core set
can still generate appropriate shares by interpolating the shares of the parties in the core set. Of course, this process needs
to be carefully designed so that no additional information is leaked to the adversary. We defer the details of this to a later
section.
1.2. Other related work
Gennaro et al. [11] initiated a study of the exact round complexity of VSS. For t < n/3, they show an efﬁcient (i.e.,
polynomial-time) (4, 3)-round protocol, and an inefﬁcient (3, 2)-round protocol. (Recall that the round complexity of VSS is
deﬁned as the number of rounds in the sharing phase; unless otherwise stated, all protocols mentioned use only one round,
without broadcast, in the reconstruction phase.) They also show that three rounds are necessary for VSS when t < n/3. For
t < n/4, they show that two rounds are necessary and sufﬁcient for efﬁcient VSS. Settling the question of the absolute round
complexity of efﬁcient VSS for t < n/3, Fitzi et al. [10] show an efﬁcient (3, 2)-round VSS protocol. The reconstruction phase
of their protocol, however, requires one round of broadcast.
As discussed extensively already, although the protocol by Fitzi et al. is optimal in terms of the total number of rounds, it is
not optimal in terms of its usage of the broadcast channel. VSS protocols for t < n/3 using one round of broadcast are known,
but these protocols are not optimal in terms of their overall round complexity. Micali and Rabin [16] give a (16, 1)-round VSS
protocol, and recent work [12,14] improved this to give a (7, 1)-round protocol.
All theworks referenced above, as well as this work, focus on perfect VSS. A natural relaxation is to consider statistical VSS
where privacy and/or correctness may fail to hold with negligible probability. Surprisingly, work subsequent to our own [17]
shows that the lower bound of Gennaro et al. no longer holds in this setting, and that there exists a protocol for statistical
VSS tolerating t < n/3 corruptions that uses only two rounds in the sharing phase. Interestingly, the reconstruction phase
of their statistical VSS protocol requires two rounds, and so the total round complexity (of the sharing and reconstruction
phases combined) matches the total round complexity of our protocol. It remains open whether the total round complexity
can be improved for statistical VSS.
1.3. Future directions
It would, of course, be nice to characterize the optimal round complexity of VSS in point-to-point networks. Though our
work represents progress toward this goal, the question is complicated by the fact that one must consider the distribution
of running times of any protocol (since strict constant-round protocols are ruled out). It would also be interesting to fully
characterize the round complexity of statistical VSS (whether for t < n/3 or t < n/2); see [17] for recent work in this
direction.
2. Model and deﬁnitions
We consider the standard communication model where parties communicate in synchronous rounds using pairwise
private and authenticated channels. We also assume a broadcast channel, with the understanding that it can be emulated in
a point-to-point network using a broadcast protocol. A broadcast channel allows any party to send the same message to all
4 That work shows a 6-round VSS protocol that uses broadcast in the ﬁnal two rounds. The ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of that protocol sufﬁce for WSS.
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other parties (and all parties to be assured they have received identical messages) in a single round. We stress that we do
not assume simultaneous broadcast, but allow rushing here as well.
When we say a protocol tolerates t malicious parties, we always mean that it is secure against an adversary who may
adaptively corrupt up to t parties during an execution of the protocol and coordinate the actions of these parties as they
deviate from the protocol in an arbitrarymanner. Parties not corrupted by the adversary are called honest. We always assume
a rushing adversary; i.e., in any round the malicious parties receive the messages sent by the honest parties before deciding
on their own messages.
2.1. VSS and variants
We now present deﬁnitions of WSS, VSS, and VSS with 2-level sharing.
Deﬁnition 1 (Weak veriﬁable secret sharing). A two-phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a distinguished
dealer D ∈ P holds initial input s, is a WSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any
adversary controlling at most t parties:
Privacy: If the dealer is honest at the end of the ﬁrst phase (the sharing phase), then at the end of this phase the joint view
of the malicious parties is independent of the dealer’s input s.
Correctness: Each honest party Pi outputs a value si at the end of the second phase (the reconstruction phase). If the dealer
is honest then si = s.
Weak commitment: At the end of the sharing phase the joint view of the honest parties deﬁnes a value s′ (which can be
computed in polynomial time from this view) such that each honest party will output either s′ or a default value ⊥ at
the end of the reconstruction phase.
Deﬁnition 2 (Veriﬁable secret sharing). A two-phase protocol for partiesP , where a distinguished dealer D ∈ P holds initial
input s, is a VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties if it satisﬁes the privacy and correctness requirements of WSS as well
as the following (stronger) commitment requirement:
Commitment: At the end of the sharing phase the joint view of the honest parties deﬁnes a value s′ (which can be computed
in polynomial time from this view) such that all honest parties will output s′ at the end of the reconstruction phase.
Deﬁnition 3 (Veriﬁable secret sharing with 2-level sharing). A two-phase protocol for parties P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, where a
distinguished dealer D ∈ P holds initial input s, is a VSS protocol with 2-level sharing tolerating t malicious parties if it satisﬁes
the privacy and correctness requirements of VSS as well as the following requirement:
Commitment with 2-level sharing: At the end of the sharing phase each honest party Pi outputs si and si,j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
satisfying the following requirements:
1. There exists a polynomial p(x) of degree at most t such that si = p(i) for every honest party Pi, and furthermore all
honest parties will output s′ = p(0) at the end of the reconstruction phase.
2. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a polynomialpj(x)of degree atmost t such that (1) pj(0) = p(j) and (2) si,j = pj(i)
for every honest party Pi.
This implies the commitment property of VSS, since the value s′ = p(0) that will be output in the reconstruction phase is
deﬁned by the view of the honest parties at the end of the sharing phase.
In our protocol descriptions, we assumewithout loss of generality that parties always send properly formattedmessages,
as wemay interpret an improper or missing message as some default message. We assume the dealer’s input s lies in a ﬁnite
ﬁeld F containing {0, 1, . . . , n} as a subset.
3. Weak veriﬁable secret sharing
We show a (3, 1)-round WSS protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties.
3.1. The protocol
Sharing phase: The sharing phase consists of three rounds, with broadcast used in the last round.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. The following steps are carried out in parallel:
• The dealer chooses a random bivariate polynomial F(x, y) of degree at most t in each variable such that F(0, 0) = s. The
dealer then sends to each party Pi the polynomials fi(x) := F(x, i) and gi(y) := F(i, y).• Each party Pi picks a random pad ri,j ∈ F for all j /= i, and sends ri,j to both Pj and the dealer D.
Round 2: Each player Pi does the following:
• For all j /= i, send ai,j := fi(j) and bi,j := gi(j) to Pj .
• Let r′j,i be the random pad that Pi received from Pj in the previous round. For all j /= i, send r′j,i to D.
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Round 3: Each player Pi does the following:
• Let a′j,i, b′j,i be the values Pi received from Pj in the previous round.
• For all j /= i, if b′j,i /= fi(j) then Pi broadcasts (j: “disagree-f ”, fi(j), ri,j); otherwise, Pi broadcasts (j: “agree-f ”, fi(j) + ri,j).
• For all j /= i, if a′j,i /= gi(j) then Pi broadcasts (j: “disagree-g”, gi(j), r′j,i); otherwise, Pi broadcasts (j: “agree-g”, gi(j) + r′j,i).
In parallel with the above, the dealer D does the following for all ordered pairs (i, j):
• Let r(1)i,j be the appropriate random pad sent by Pi to D in round 1, and let r(2)i,j be the appropriate random pad sent by Pj
to D in round 2.
• If r(1)i,j /= r(2)i,j , then D broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, F(j, i)). Otherwise, D broadcasts ((i, j): “equal”, F(j, i) + r(1)i,j ).
Local computation: An ordered pair of parties (Pi, Pj) is conﬂicting if, in round 3, party Pi broadcasts (j : “disagree-f ”, fi(j), ri,j);
party Pj broadcasts (i: “disagree-g”, gj(i), r
′
i,j); and ri,j = r′i,j . For a pair of conﬂicting parties (Pi, Pj), we say Pi (resp., Pj) is
unhappy if one of the following conditions hold:
• The dealer broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, di,j) and di,j /= fi(j) (resp., di,j /= gj(i)).
• The dealer broadcasts ((i, j): “equal”, di,j) and di,j /= fi(j) + ri,j (resp., di,j /= gj(i) + r′i,j).
A player is happy if it is not unhappy. Note that all parties agree on which players are happy and which are not. If there are
more than t unhappy parties, the dealer is disqualiﬁed and a default value is shared.
Reconstruction phase: The reconstruction phase is similar to the one in [10], except that we do not use broadcast.
1. Every happy party Pi sends the polynomials fi(x) and gi(y) to all other parties.
2. Let f ij , g
i
j denote the polynomials that Pj sent to Pi in the previous step. Pi then constructs a consistency graph Gi whose
vertices correspond to the happy parties:
• Initially, there is an edge between Pj and Pk in Gi if and only if f ij (k) = gik(j) and gij(k) = f ik(j). (Note that we allow
also the case j = k here.)
• If there exists a vertex in Gi whose degree is less than n − t (including self-loops), then that vertex is removed fromGi.
This is repeated until no more vertices can be removed.
Let Corei denote the parties whose corresponding vertices remain in Gi.
3. If |Corei| < n − t, then Pi outputs ⊥. Otherwise, Pi reconstructs the polynomial F ′(x, y) deﬁned by any t + 1 parties in
Corei, and outputs s′ := F ′(0, 0).
We remark that, since we do not use broadcast in the reconstruction phase, it is possible that Corei,Corej are different
for different honest parties Pi, Pj .
3.2. Proofs
Lemma 1. If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, then privacy is preserved.
Proof. Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase. We show that if the dealer remains
uncorrupted, then the information the adversary has about the dealer’s input at the end of the sharing phase consists of
the polynomials {fi(x), gi(y)}Pi∈C . Since F(x, y) is a random bivariate polynomial of degree at most t and |C| ≤ t, a standard
argument implies that the view of the adversary is independent of the dealer’s input s.
It is immediate that the adversary learns nothing additional about s in rounds 1 or 2. As for the values broadcast in round 3,
consider any ordered pair (Pi, Pj) of parties who remain honest throughout the sharing phase. Since the dealer is honest,
we have fi(j) = gj(i) = F(j, i) and, since Pi, Pj are honest, we have ri,j = r′i,j . Thus, in round 3 parties Pi, Pj , and the dealer
all broadcast the same “blinded” value F(j, i) + ri,j . Since ri,j is chosen uniformly at random, the parties in C do not learn
anything about the value of F(j, i). 
Lemma 2. If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, then correctness holds.
Proof. If the dealer remains honest then no honest party will be unhappy. It follows that the dealer is not disqualiﬁed at the
end of sharing phase.
Let Pi be honest. In the reconstruction phase, Corei contains all the honest parties and so |Corei| ≥ n − t. We claim that
for any Pj ∈ Corei, it holds that f ij (x) = F(x, j) and gij(y) = F(j, y), where F is the dealer’s polynomial. When Pj is honest this
is immediate. When Pj is malicious, the fact that Pj ∈ Corei means that f ij (k) = gik(j) = F(k, j) for at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1
honest partiesPk . Since f
i
j (x)hasdegree atmost t, it follows that f
i
j (x) = F(x, j). A similar argument shows that gij(y) = F(j, y).
Therefore, the polynomial F ′(x, y) reconstructed by Pi is equal to F(x, y), and Pi outputs s = F(0, 0). 
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Lemma 3. Weak commitment holds.
Proof. The case of an honest dealer follows from the proof of correctness, so we consider the case of a malicious dealer. If
there are more than t unhappy parties, the dealer is disqualiﬁed and weak commitment trivially holds; so, assume there are
at most t unhappy parties. Then there are at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 honest parties who are happy. LetH denote the ﬁrst t + 1
such parties. The polynomials fi sent by the dealer to the parties inH deﬁne a bivariate polynomial Fˆ(x, y) in the natural way:
namely, let Fˆ be such that Fˆ(x, i) = fi(x) for each Pi ∈ H. Because parties inH are happy, it holds also that Fˆ(i, y) = gi(y) for
all Pi ∈ H. Set s′ := Fˆ(0, 0). We show that every honest party outputs either ⊥ or s′ in the reconstruction phase.
Consider an honest party Pi in the reconstruction phase. If |Corei| < n − t then Pi outputs ⊥ and we are done. Say
|Corei| ≥ n − t. We claim that for each Pj ∈ Corei, it holds that f ij (x) = Fˆ(x, j) and gij(y) = Fˆ(j, y). When Pj is honest, the fact
that Pj is happy (which is true since Pj ∈ Corei) means that f ij (k) = fj(k) = gk(j) = Fˆ(k, j) for all t + 1 parties Pk ∈ H. Since
f ij is a polynomial of degree at most t, this implies that f
i
j (x) = Fˆ(x, j). A similar argument shows that gij(y) = Fˆ(j, y). When
Pj ∈ Corei is malicious, we have that f ij (k) = gik(j) = Fˆ(k, j) for at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 honest parties Pk ∈ Corei. Again,
since f ij (x) has degree at most t it follows that f
i
j (x) = Fˆ(x, j), and a similar argument shows that gij(y) = Fˆ(j, y). Therefore,
the polynomial reconstructed by Pi is equal to Fˆ(x, y), and Pi outputs s
′ = Fˆ(0, 0). 
As the proof of the above lemma indicates, our WSS protocol also satisﬁes a weak variant of 2-level sharing that we state
for future reference:
Lemma 4. Say the dealer is not disqualiﬁed in an execution of theWSS protocol, and letH denote the set of all honest parties who
are happy. Then there is a bivariate polynomial Fˆ of degree at most t in each variable such that, at the end of the sharing phase,
the polynomials fi, gi held by each Pi ∈ H satisfy fi(x) = Fˆ(x, i) and gi(y) = Fˆ(i, y).
As a consequence, each Pi ∈ H can compute si and {si,j}j∈{1,...,n} such that:
1. There is a polynomial p(x) of degree at most t with si = p(i), and furthermore all honest parties output either s′ = p(0) or⊥
in the reconstruction phase.
2. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a polynomial pj(x) of degree at most t such that (1) pj(0) = p(j) and (2) si,j = pj(i).
Proof. When the dealer is honest take Fˆ to be the dealer’s polynomial. When the dealer is dishonest, let Fˆ be the bivariate
polynomial deﬁned in the proof of the preceding lemma. Set p(x)
def= Fˆ(0, x) and pj(x) def= Fˆ(x, j). In what follows we assume
a dishonest dealer, but it is immediate that everything (trivially) holds also if the dealer is honest.
The proof of the preceding lemma shows that, at the end of the sharing phase, each Pi ∈ H holds polynomials fi, gi with
fi(x) = Fˆ(x, i) and gi(y) = Fˆ(i, y), and such that all honest parties output either s′ = Fˆ(0, 0) or⊥ in the reconstruction phase.
Then each Pi ∈ H can compute si := fi(0) = Fˆ(0, i) = p(i) and si,j := gi(j) = Fˆ(i, j) = pj(i). Furthermore, s′ = p(0). Finally,
pj(0) = Fˆ(0, j) = p(j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, all the stated requirements hold. 
4. Veriﬁable secret sharing
Beforewe describe our VSS protocolwith 2-level sharing,we review the ideas used in [10] to transform theirWSS protocol
into a VSS protocol (that does not have 2-level sharing). At a high level, the sharing phase of the VSS protocol is more-or-less
the same as the sharing phase of the underlying WSS protocol; the difference is that now, in the reconstruction phase, each
party reveals the random pads they used in the sharing phase. A problem that arises is to ensure that a malicious party Pi
reveals the “correct” random pads. This is enforced by having each player act as a dealer in its own execution of WSS, and
“binding” the random pads of each party to this execution of WSS. In more detail: in parallel with the sharing phase of the
larger VSS protocol, each party Pi also acts as a dealer and shares a random secret using theWSS protocol. Let F
pad
i (x, y) be the
corresponding bivariate polynomial chosen by Pi. Then Pi will use ri,j := Fpadi (0, j) as the appropriate “random pad” in the
larger VSS protocol. (The pads {ri,j} used by any honest party Pi are thus no longer independent, but secrecy is still preserved
since they lie on a random degree-t polynomial.) These random pads are then revealed in the reconstruction phase by using
the reconstruction phase of the underlying WSS protocol.
We can use the ideas outlined in the previous paragraph to obtain a (3, 1)-round VSS protocol, but the resulting protocol
will not have 2-level sharing. Yet all is not lost. As observed already in Lemma 4, by the end of the sharing phase the honest
parties who are happywill have the required 2-level shares. To achieve our desired result wemust therefore only enable any
unhappy honest party to construct its 2-level shares.
At a high level, we do this as follows: Suppose Fˆ(x, y) is the dealer’s bivariate polynomial, deﬁned by the end of the sharing
phase of the VSS protocol, and let Pi be an honest party who is unhappy.We need to show how Pi constructs the polynomials
Fˆ(x, i) and Fˆ(i, y) (which it will use to generate its 2-level shares exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4). Let Pj be a party such
that:
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• Pj is happy (in the larger VSS protocol);• Pj was not disqualiﬁed as a dealer it its own execution of WSS; and• Pi is happy in Pj ’s execution of WSS.
From the proof of Lemma 4, we know there is a bivariate polynomial Fˆ
pad
j (x, y) for which Pi holds the univariate polynomial
Fˆ
pad
j (x, i). Furthermore, Pj has effectively broadcasted the polynomial Bj(x)
def= Fˆ(x, j) + Fˆpadj (0, x) in round 3, since it has
broadcasted Fˆ(k, j) + Fˆpadj (0, k) for all k. Thus, party Pi can compute
Fˆ(i, j) := Bj(i) − Fˆpadj (0, i) = Fˆ(i, j)
for any party Pj satisfying the above conditions. If there are t + 1 parties satisfying the above conditions, then Pi can
reconstruct the polynomial Fˆ(i, y).
Unfortunately, it is not clear how to extend the above approach to enable Pi to also reconstruct the polynomial Fˆ(x, i) in the
case when Fˆ is an arbitrary bivariate polynomial. For this reason, we have the dealer use a symmetric5 bivariate polynomial.
Then Fˆ(x, i) = Fˆ(i, x) and we are done.
4.1. The protocol
We show a (3, 1)-round VSS protocol with 2-level sharing that tolerates t < n/3 malicious parties.
Sharing phase: The sharing phase consists of three rounds, with broadcast used in the last round.
Round 1: The dealer holds s. The following steps are carried out in parallel:
• The dealer chooses a random symmetric bivariate polynomial F(x, y) of degree t in each variable such that F(0, 0) = s.
Then D sends to each party Pi the polynomial fi(x) := F(x, i). Note that F(x, i) = F(i, x) since F is symmetric.• Each party Pi picks a random value sˆi and executes the ﬁrst round of the WSS protocol described in the previous section,
acting as a dealer to share the “input” sˆi. We refer to this instance of the WSS protocol as WSSi.
• Let Fpadi (x, y) denote the bivariate polynomial used by Pi in WSSi (i.e., Fpadi (0, 0) = sˆi). Party Pi sends the polynomial
ri(y) := Fpadi (0, y) to the dealer D.
Round 2: Each party Pi does the following:
• Run round 2 of WSSj , for all j.• For all j /= i, send ai,j := fi(j) to Pj .
• For all j /= i, let f padj,i (x) be the polynomial that Pj sent to Pi in round 1 of WSSj . (If Pj is honest then f padj,i (x) = Fpadj (x, i).)
Party Pi sends r
′
j,i := f padj,i (0) to D.
Round 3: Each party Pi does the following:
• Run round 3 of WSSj , for all j.
• For all j /= i, let a′j,i be the value Pi received from Pj in the previous round. If a′j,i /= fi(j), then Pi broadcasts (j: “disagree”,
fi(j), F
pad
i (0, j)). Otherwise, Pi broadcasts (j: “agree”, fi(j) + Fpadi (0, j)).
In parallel with the above, the dealer D does the following for all ordered pairs (i, j):
• Let r(1)i be the polynomial sent by Pi to D in round 1, and let r(2)i,j be the appropriate random pad sent by Pj to D in round 2.
• If r(1)i (j) /= r(2)i,j , then D broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, F(j, i)). Otherwise, D broadcasts ((i, j): “equal”, F(j, i) + r(1)i (j)).
Local computation: Each party locally carries out the following steps:
1. An ordered pair of parties (Pi, Pj) is conﬂicting if, in round 3, party Pi broadcasts (j: “disagree”, fi(j), F
pad
i (0, j)); party Pj
broadcasts (i: “disagree”, fj(i), f
pad
i,j (0)); and it holds that F
pad
i (0, j) = f padi,j (0). For a pair of conﬂicting parties (Pi, Pj), we
say that Pi (resp., Pj) is unhappy if one of the following conditions hold:
(a) D broadcasts ((i, j): “not equal”, di,j) and di,j /= fi(j) (resp., di,j /= fj(i)).
(b) D broadcasts ((i, j): “equal”, di,j) and di,j /= fi(j) + Fpadi (0, j) (resp., di,j /= fj(i) + f padi,j (0)).
A party is happy if it is not unhappy.
5 Apolynomial F is symmetric if, for all,m, the coefﬁcient of the term xym is equal to the coefﬁcient of the term xmy . If F is symmetric then F(i, j) = F(j, i)
for all i, j.
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LetCoredenote the set of partieswho are happywith respect to the deﬁnition above. For every Pi whowasnot disqualiﬁed
as the dealer in WSSi, let Corei denote the set of parties who are happy with respect to WSSi. (If Pi was disqualiﬁed in
WSSi, then set Corei := ∅.)
Note that all parties have the same view regarding Core and the {Corei}.
2. For all i, j, remove Pj from Corei if either of the following hold for the ordered pair (i, j) in round 3:
• Pi broadcasts (j: “agree”, y) and Pj did not broadcast (i: “agree”, y).
• Pi broadcasts (j : “disagree”, ,w) and Pj broadcasts either (i : “agree”, ) or (i : “disagree”, ,w′)withw′ /= w. (Here,
 denotes an arbitrary value.)
3. Remove Pi from Core if |Core ∩ Corei| < n − t. (Thus, in particular, if Pi was disqualiﬁed in WSSi then Pi 	∈ Core.)
Note that all parties still have the same view of Core and the {Corei}.
4. If |Core| < n − t, then the dealer is disqualiﬁed and a default value (along with default 2-level shares) are shared.
5. Each party Pi computes a polynomial fˆi(x) of degree at most t:
(a) If Pi ∈ Core, then fˆi(x) is the polynomial that Pi received from the dealer in round 1.
(b) If Pi /∈ Core, then Pi computes fˆi(x) in the following way:
i. Pi ﬁrst deﬁnes a set Core′i as follows: A party Pj is in Core′i if and only if all the following conditions hold:
• Pj ∈ Core and Pi ∈ Corej .• Deﬁnepj,k , fork ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as follows: if in round3partyPj broadcasted (k : “agree”, yj,k), then setpj,k := yj,k .
If Pj broadcasted (k: “disagree”, wj,k , zj,k), then set pj,k := wj,k + zj,k .
We require that the {pj,k} lie on a polynomial Bj(x) of degree at most t; i.e., such that Bj(k) = pj,k for all k. (If
not, then Pj is not included in Core′i .)
Our proofs will show that |Core′i| ≥ t + 1 if the dealer is not disqualiﬁed.
ii. For each Pj ∈ Core′i , set pj := pj,i − f padj,i (0). Let fˆi be the polynomial of degree at most t such that fˆi(j) = pj for
every Pj ∈ Core′i . (It will follow from our proof that such an fˆi exists.)
6. Finally, Pi outputs si := fˆi(0) and si,j := fˆi(j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Reconstruction phase: Each party Pi sends si to all other parties. Let s
′
j,i be the value that Pj sends to Pi. Using Reed-Solomon
decoding, Pi computes a polynomial f (x) of degree at most t such that f (j) = s′j,i for at least 2t + 1 values of j. The ﬁnal
output of Pi is f (0).
4.2. Proofs
We prove that the protocol given in the previous section is a VSS protocol with 2-level sharing that tolerates t < n/3
malicious parties.
Lemma 5. If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, privacy is preserved.
Proof. Let C denote the set of parties corrupted by the end of the sharing phase. We show that if the dealer remains
uncorrupted, then the view of the adversary can be simulated given the polynomials {fi(x)}Pi∈C . Since F(x, y) is a random
symmetric bivariate polynomial of degree at most t and |C| ≤ t, a standard argument (see, e.g., [4]) implies that the view of
the adversary is independent of the dealer’s input s.
It is immediate that the adversary learns nothing additional about s in round 2. As for the values broadcast in round 3,
consider an ordered pair (Pi, Pj) of parties who remain honest throughout the sharing phase. Since the dealer is honest, we
have fi(j) = F(j, i) = F(i, j) = fj(i) and, since Pi, Pj are honest, ri(j) = r′i,j . Thus, in round 3, parties Pi, Pj , and the dealer all
broadcast the same “blinded” value fi(j) + Fpadi (0, j). Since Fpadi (0, y) is a random polynomial of degree at most t this does
not leak any information about the {fi(x)}Pi 	∈C that the adversary does not already know. 
Lemma 6. If the dealer is not corrupted by the end of the sharing phase, then correctness and commitment with 2-level sharing
hold.
Proof. If the dealer is honest, then no honest party is unhappy. Also, all honest parties are in Corei for any honest player Pi.
Since there are at leastn − t honest parties, nohonest party is removed fromCore. It follows that thedealer is not disqualiﬁed.
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Since all honest parties are inCore, each honest party Pi sets fˆi(x) := fi(x) = F(x, i). Deﬁning p(x) def= F(0, x) and pj(x) def=
F(j, x), it is straightforward to verify that the properties of commitment with 2-level sharing hold:
• Each honest party Pi outputs si := fˆi(0) = F(0, i) = p(i).• For all j, it holds that pj(0) = F(j, 0) = F(0, j) = p(j).• For each honest party Pi and all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
si,j = fˆi(j) = F(j, i) = pj(i).
In the reconstruction phase, s′j,i = sj = p(j) for any honest party Pj . Thus, each honest party Pi receives at most t values s′j,i
that do not lie on the polynomial p(x). It follows that Pi outputs s = p(0) = F(0, 0), the dealer’s input. This completes the
proof. 
We now move on to show that commitment with 2-level sharing holds even when the dealer is malicious. The case of
a disqualiﬁed dealer is obvious, so we focus on the case of a malicious dealer who is not disqualiﬁed. We begin by proving
three claims:
Claim 7. If the dealer is not disqualiﬁed, then for any honest Pi it holds that |Core′i| ≥ t + 1.
Proof. If the dealerwas not disqualiﬁed, thenCore contains at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 honest parties.We show that any honest
Pj ∈ Core is also in Core′i , proving the claim.
Since Pi and Pj are both honest, Pi ∈ Corej . Set B(x) def= fj(x) + Fpadj (0, x). This is a polynomial of degree at most t, and the
pj,k computed by Pi all lie on Bj(x). We conclude that Pj ∈ Core′i . 
Claim 8. If the dealer is not disqualiﬁed in the sharing phase, there is a bivariate symmetric polynomial Fˆ(x, y) of degree at most t
in each variable that is consistent with the polynomials fˆi computed by every honest party in Core; i.e., for every honest Pi ∈ Core
it holds that fˆi(x) = Fˆ(x, i).
Proof. If the dealer is not disqualiﬁed, then there are at least n − t parties in Core and at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 of them are
honest. Let H denote the ﬁrst t + 1 such parties. The polynomials fi sent by the dealer to the parties in H deﬁne a bivariate
polynomial Fˆ(x, y) in the natural way: namely, let Fˆ be such that Fˆ(x, i) = fi(x) for each Pi ∈ H. We show that Fˆ satisﬁes the
requirements of the claim.
By deﬁnition of Fˆ , we have fˆi(x) = fi(x) = Fˆ(x, i) for any Pi ∈ H. Next, observe that for every honest Pi, Pj ∈ Core it holds
that fˆi(j) = fˆj(i). Indeed, itmust be the case that fi(j) = fj(i) (or else one of Pi or Pj would be unhappy), and since Pi, Pj ∈ Core
we have fˆi(x) = fi(x) and fˆj(x) = fj(x). SinceH ⊂ Core, this implies that Fˆ is symmetric. It also implies that for every honest
Pi ∈ Core (i.e., not just the Pi ∈ H) we have fˆi(x) = Fˆ(i, x) = Fˆ(x, i), proving the claim. 
Claim 9. Assume the dealer is not disqualiﬁed in the sharing phase, and let Fˆ be the polynomial guaranteed to exist by Claim 8.
Then for any honest Pi 	∈ Core, it holds that fˆi(x) = Fˆ(x, i).
Proof. Fix an honest Pi 	∈ Core, and an arbitrary Pj ∈ Core′i . (Claim 7 shows that Core′i is non-empty.) By deﬁnition, this
means Pj ∈ Core and Pi ∈ Corej . So Pj was not disqualiﬁed as a dealer in WSSj and, by Lemma 4, there exists a bivariate
polynomial Fˆ
pad
j of degree atmost t in each variable such that f
pad
j,k (x) = Fˆpadj (x, k) for all Pk ∈ Corej . (Recall that f padj,k denotes
the polynomial that Pj sent to Pk in round 1 of WSSj .)
Let pj,k be the values computed by Pi, and let Bj(x) be a polynomial of degree at most t such that Bj(k) = pj,k for all k. Such
a polynomial is guaranteed to exist because otherwise Pj 	∈ Core′i .
Since Pj remains inCore, we have |Core ∩ Corej| ≥ n − t. Thismeans that there are at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1honest parties
that are in both Core andCorej . Letting Fˆ be the symmetric polynomial guaranteed by the previous claim, we now show that
for any honest Pk ∈ Core ∩ Corej we have Bj(k) = Fˆ(k, j) + Fˆpadj (0, k). There are two cases to consider:
• If in round 3 party Pj broadcasted (k : “agree”, yj,k), then pj,k := yj,k . Since Pk ∈ Corej , this implies that party Pk must
have broadcasted (j : “agree”, yk,j) with yk,j = yj,k in that round (cf. step 2 of the local computation phase). Since Pk is
honest we have
Bj(k) = pj,k = yj,k = yk,j
= fk(j) + f padj,k (0)
= Fˆ(j, k) + f padj,k (0) (using Claim 8 and Pk ∈ Core)
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= Fˆ(j, k) + Fˆpadj (0, k) (since Pk ∈ Corej)
= Fˆ(k, j) + Fˆpadj (0, k),
using the fact that Fˆ is symmetric.
• If in round 3 party Pj broadcasted (k : “disagree”,wj,k , zj,k) then, because Pk ∈ Corej , this implies that party Pk must have
broadcasted (j : “disagree”,wk,j , zk,j)with zk,j = zj,k . It must also be the case thatwk,j = wj,k or else one of Pj or Pk would
be unhappy. It follows that
Bj(k) = pj,k = wj,k + zj,k = wk,j + zk,j ,
and then an argument as before shows that Bj(k) = Fˆ(k, j) + Fˆpadj (0, k).
Summarizing, we have Bj(k) = Fˆ(k, j) + Fˆpadj (0, k) for at least t + 1 values of k. Since Bj(x) has degree at most t, this
means Bj(x) = Fˆ(x, j) + Fˆpadj (0, x).
Party Pi next computes
pj := pj,i − f padj,i (0) = Bj(i) − Fˆpadj (0, i) = Fˆ(i, j) + Fˆpadj (0, i) − Fˆpadj (0, i) = Fˆ(i, j),
using the fact that Pi ∈ Corej in the ﬁrst line. Since this is true for arbitrary Pj ∈ Core′i , we see that the polynomial fˆi computed
by Pi satisﬁes fˆi(x) = Fˆ(i, x) = Fˆ(x, i). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 10. Even when the dealer is malicious, commitment with 2-level sharing holds.
Proof. By the preceding two claims, at the end of the sharing phase there exists a symmetric bivariate polynomial Fˆ(x, y)
with degree atmost t in each variable such that fˆi(x) = Fˆ(x, i) for any honest party Pi. Set p(x) := Fˆ(x, 0) and pj(x) := Fˆ(x, j).
One can then verify that the properties of commitment with 2-level sharing hold:
• Each honest party Pi outputs si def= fˆi(0) = Fˆ(0, i) = Fˆ(i, 0) = p(i).• At the end of the reconstruction phase, each honest party Pi will output s′ = p(0).
• For all j, it holds that pj(0) = Fˆ(0, j) = p(j).• For each honest party Pi and all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
si,j
def= fˆi(j) = Fˆ(j, i) = Fˆ(i, j) = pj(i).
This completes the proof. 
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